The practical electricity market is an imperfect competition market and some models are employed to simulate the strategies of suppliers. In the paper, the Cournot model is used to simulate the competition of suppliers and transmission constraints are considered. First, one general Cournot model considering transmission constraints based on DC power flow is presented. Secondly, a simple two-bus network and a three-bus loop network are used to analyse the effects of transmission constraints on the pure strategies of suppliers. A two-bus and three-bus example are employed to calculate the pure strategy equilibria of suppliers with the condition that pure strategy equilibria exist. The results show that there may exist different pure strategy equilibria if transmission constraints are considered. In the meantime, the transmission capacity must far exceed the power flow of the line under the equilibrium condition to obtain the same equilibrium without consideration of transmission constraints.
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