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access icon free Optical PUFs as physical root of trust for blockchain-driven applications

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 01/08/2018, Accepted 29/11/2018, Revised 12/11/2018, Published 11/12/2018

In an environment where cyber attacks are increasing, both in frequency and complexity, novel ways to shield data, users, and procedures have to be envisioned. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are the physical equivalent of one-way mathematical transformations with the exception that their inherent physical complexity renders them resilient to cloning. One interesting deployment scenario includes PUFs as random key generators. The deterministic nature of their operation alleviates the necessity to store the keys in non-volatile means. Along the same lines, blockchain is inherently resistant to modification of the data once stored while their overall security depends on the quality and secrecy of users’ keys. Here, the authors propose a novel optical PUF implementation that can be combined with private blockchain modalities in order to cyber-harden Internet of things ecosystems. PUF-related experimental results are presented, alongside implementation scenarios.

Inspec keywords: Internet of Things; distributed databases; data privacy; cryptography

Other keywords: optical PUF implementation; cyber attacks; physical unclonable functions; one-way mathematical transformations; private blockchain modalities; security; cyber-harden Internet of Things ecosystems; random key generators; optical PUFs; blockchain-driven applications

Subjects: Mobile, ubiquitous and pervasive computing; Distributed databases; Data security

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