Chosen message strategy to improve the correlation power analysis

Chosen message strategy to improve the correlation power analysis

For access to this article, please select a purchase option:

Buy eFirst article PDF
(plus tax if applicable)
Buy Knowledge Pack
10 articles for $120.00
(plus taxes if applicable)

IET members benefit from discounts to all IET publications and free access to E&T Magazine. If you are an IET member, log in to your account and the discounts will automatically be applied.

Learn more about IET membership 

Recommend Title Publication to library

You must fill out fields marked with: *

Librarian details
Your details
Why are you recommending this title?
Select reason:
IET Information Security — Recommend this title to your library

Thank you

Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

Nowadays cryptographic circuits are subject to attacks that no longer focus on the algorithm but on its physical implementation. Attacks exploiting information leaked by the hardware implementation are called side-channel attacks (SCA). In particular, the popular correlation power analysis (CPA) is known by its effectiveness. This paper presents a new method for an original optimisation of the CPA to recover secret keys with less power consumption traces than what is expected from the standard CPA. This improvement is done by choosing appropriate plaintexts, both non-adaptively and adaptively. A mathematical proof of the proposed procedure is provided for any cryptographic device with any known leakage model. The proposed technique is tested on the advanced encryption system (AES) S-box input (resp. output) implemented in an ATMega 163 smartcard, with hamming weight leakage model.

Related content

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address