SignORKE: improving pairing-based one-round key exchange without random oracles

SignORKE: improving pairing-based one-round key exchange without random oracles

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The study presents a new efficient way to construct the one-round key exchange (ORKE) without random oracles based on standard hard complexity assumptions. The authors propose a (PKI-based) ORKE protocol which is more computational efficient than existing pairing-based ORKE protocols without random oracles in the post-specified peer setting. The core idea of this construction is to integrate the consistency check of the ephemeral public key and the verification of the signature into the session key generation. This enables us to roughly save two pairing operations. The authors just call this kind of scheme that is deeply composed by signature and one-round key exchange as SignORKE. The authors’ protocol is shown to be secure in a variant of the Canetti–Krawczyk security model which covers the majority of state-of-the-art active attacks.


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