access icon free Known-key distinguishers on 15-round 4-branch type-2 generalised Feistel networks with single substitution–permutation functions and near-collision attacks on its hashing modes

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 09/12/2013, Accepted 27/11/2014, Published 18/02/2015

Generalised Feistel network (GFN) is a popular design for block ciphers and hash functions. The round function of the network often chooses a substitution–permutation (SP) transformation (consists of a subkey XOR, an S-boxes layer and a linear layer). In 2011, Bogdanov and Shibutani provided another choice to build round functions, namely the double SP-functions, which has two SP-layers in series. They showed that a 4-branch type-2 GFN with double SP-functions was stronger than the one with single SP-function in terms of the number of active S-boxes in a differential or linear cryptanalysis, but some subsequent results showed that the double SP-function is the weaker one in some known-key scenarios and hashing modes. In this study, the authors present a new result of the 4-branch type-2 GFN, whose round function is a single SP-function. They show some 15-round truncated differential distinguishers for this network with four usual parameters by utilising some rebound attack techniques. Based on these distinguishers, they construct some 15-round near-collision attacks on the Matyas–Meyer–Oseas and Miyaguchi–Preneel compression function modes in which the 4-branch type-2 GFN with the single SP-function is used.

Inspec keywords: cryptography; file organisation

Other keywords: block ciphers; rebound attack techniques; Miyaguchi–Preneel compression function modes; SP-layers; 15-round 4-branch type-2 generalised Feistel networks; near-collision attacks; subkey XOR; 15-round near-collision attacks; single substitution permutation functions; differential cryptanalysis; single SP-function; hash functions; known-key distinguishers; S-boxes layer; 4-branch type-2 GFN; Matyas–Meyer–Oseas; double SP-functions; SP transformation; substitution permutation transformation; linear cryptanalysis; linear layer; hashing modes

Subjects: File organisation; Data security; Cryptography

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