Loss and emission reduction allocation in distribution networks using MCRS method and Aumann–Shapley value method
In order to provide reasonable economic signals for distribution companies (DISCOs) and further compensate for distributed generators (DGs) integrated in distribution networks equitably, the contributions of DGs to loss and emission reduction in distribution networks should be allocated according to their own responsibilities. Generally, the loss and emission reduction of the network can be allocated based on traditional cooperative-game-based allocation methods such as nucleolus method and Shapley value method. However, traditional cooperative-game-based allocation methods will result in the combinational explosion problem with the integration of a large number of DGs. In order to tackle this problem, minimum costs-remaining savings (MCRS) method and Aumann–Shapley value method are employed for loss and emission reduction allocation. Simulation results of two cases show that compared with the allocation results of traditional cooperative-game-based allocation methods, the proposed MCRS method and Aumann–Shapley value method both have the characteristics of individual rationality, coalition rationality, and global rationality. Furthermore, neither MCRS method nor Aumann–Shapley value method has the problem of combinational explosion, which can reduce computational burden with regard to the integration of a large number of DGs.