Advanced algorithm to detect stealthy cyber attacks on automatic generation control in smart grid

Fatemeh Akbarian; Amin Ramezani; Mohammad-Taghi Hamidi-Beheshti; Vahid Haghighat

Advanced algorithm to detect stealthy cyber attacks on automatic generation control in smart grid

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Author(s): Fatemeh Akbarian^{1, 2} ; Amin Ramezani¹ ; Mohammad-Taghi Hamidi-Beheshti¹ ; Vahid Haghighat³
- Affiliations: 1: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering , Tarbiat Modares University , Tehran , Iran ;
  2: Department of Electrical and Information Technology , Lund University , Lund , Sweden ;
  3: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering , Shahid Beheshti University , Tehran , Iran
Source: Volume 5, Issue 4, December 2020, p. 351 – 358
DOI: 10.1049/iet-cps.2019.0074 , Online ISSN 2398-3396

This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)

Received 12/10/2019, Accepted 03/08/2020, Revised 04/03/2020, Published 02/10/2020

One of the basic requirements of today's sophisticated world is the availability of electrical energy, and neglect of this matter may have irreparable damages such as an extensive blackout. The problems which were introduced about the traditional power grid, and also, the growing advances in smart technologies make the traditional power grid go towards smart power grid. Although widespread utilisation of telecommunication networks in smart power grid enhances the efficiency of the system, it will create a critical platform for cyber attacks and penetration into the system. Automatic generation control (AGC) is a fundamental control system in the power grid, and it is responsible for controlling the frequency of the grid. An attack on the data transmitted through the telecommunications link from the sensors to the AGC will cause frequency deviation, resulting in disconnection of the load, generators and ultimately global blackout. In this study, by using a Kalman filter and a proposed detector, a solution has been presented to detect the attack before it can affect the system. Contrary to existing methods, this method is able to detect attacks that are stealthy from the area control error signal and χ²-detector. Simulations confirm the effectiveness of this method.

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Advanced algorithm to detect stealthy cyber attacks on automatic generation control in smart grid

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