In 1997, two self-certified key exchange protocols were proposed by Saeednia. It is shown that Saeednia's self-certified key exchange protocols are insecure in that an adversary may impersonate any legitimate user in key exchange. An improvement against the impersonation attack is described.
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http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1049/el_19980797
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content/journals/10.1049/el_19980797
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