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Incentives for individual compliance with pandemic response measures

Incentives for individual compliance with pandemic response measures

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The common methods to fight against COVID-19 are quasi-standard measures which include wearing masks, social distancing and vaccination. However, combining these measures into an efficient holistic pandemic response instrument is even more involved than anticipated. We argue that some non-trivial factors behind the varying effectiveness of these measures are selfish decision-making and the differing national implementations of the response mechanism. In this chapter, through simple models, we analyze the impacts of individual incentives on different measures of the decisions made with respect to social distancing, mask wearing, and vaccination. We shed light on how these may result in suboptimal outcomes and demonstrate the responsibility of national authorities in designing these games properly regarding data transparency, the chosen policies, and their influence on the preferred outcome. We promote a mechanism design approach: it is in the best interest of every government to carefully balance social good and response costs when implementing their respective pandemic response mechanism; moreover, there is no one-size-fits-all blueprint when designing an effective solution.

Chapter Contents:

  • 9.1 Introduction
  • 9.1.1 Contribution
  • 9.1.2 Organization
  • 9.1.3 Preliminaries
  • 9.1.4 Game theory
  • 9.1.5 Rationality
  • 9.1.6 Nash equilibrium
  • 9.1.7 Social optimum
  • 9.1.8 Mechanism design
  • 9.2 Related work
  • 9.2.1 Game-theoretic models
  • 9.3 The distancing game
  • 9.3.1 Basic distancing game
  • 9.3.2 Extended distancing game
  • 9.4 The Mask Game
  • 9.5 Vaccination models
  • 9.5.1 Duration-efficiency decision
  • 9.5.2 Availability-efficiency decision
  • 9.5.3 Duration-efficiency-availability decision
  • 9.5.4 Side-effect decision
  • 9.6 Pandemic mechanism design
  • 9.6.1 The Government as mechanism designer
  • 9.6.2 Data quality and transparency
  • 9.6.3 Social distancing
  • 9.6.4 Mask wearing
  • 9.6.5 Vaccination
  • 9.6.6 Testing and contact tracing
  • 9.6.7 The big picture
  • 9.7 Conclusion
  • 9.7.1 Limitations
  • 9.7.2 Future work
  • References

Inspec keywords: decision making; game theory; quality control

Other keywords: vaccination; nontrivial factors; individual compliance; individual incentives; pandemic response measures; efficient holistic pandemic response instrument; preferred outcome; social distancing; varying effectiveness; social good response costs; differing national implementations; wearing masks; suboptimal outcomes; mask wearing; mechanism design approach; quasistandard measures; national authorities; COVID-19; respective pandemic response mechanism; selfish decision-making

Subjects: Combinatorial mathematics; Game theory; Information networks

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