We describe and contrast different market mechanisms to incentivize residential electricity customers to perform demand response (DR) via load shifting of schedulable assets. A customer-incentive pricing (CIP) mechanism from our past research is discussed, and compared to flat-rate, time-of-use (TOU), and real-time pricing (RTP). The comparison is made using a for-profit aggregator-based residential DR approach to solve the “Smart Grid resource allocation” (SGRA) problem. The aggregator uses a heuristic framework to schedule customer assets and to determine the customer-incentive price to maximize profit. Different customer response models are proposed to emulate customer behavior in the aggregator DR program. A large-scale system consisting of 5,555 residential customer households and 56,588 schedulable assets using real pricing data over a period of 24 h is simulated and controlled using the aggregator. We show that the aggregator enacts a beneficial change on the load profile of the overall power system by reducing peak demand. Additionally, the customers who are more flexible with their loads, represented as a parameter in the proposed customer α-model, have a greater reduction on their electricity bill.1
Customer modeling and pricing-mechanisms for demand response in smart electric distribution grids, Page 1 of 2
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