IEE Proceedings - Information Security
Volume 153, Issue 2, June 2006
Volume 153, Issue 2
June 2006
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- Author(s): Z. Hayat ; J. Reeve ; C. Boutle
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 2, p. 43 –50
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055109
- Type: Article
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On large networks security administration tasks such as patch management and event log analysis can take many hours and even days to successfully complete even with automated solutions. Currently it is left to the systems administrators' discretion to choose in which order to protect individual devices. In light of the rapidly decreasing time between vulnerabilities being discovered and maliciously exploited by malware, such an arbitrary method introduces an unacceptable level of risk to the security of those devices, which are critical to business processes. An information risk management approach needs to be adopted to ensure the protection of the network with a high likelihood; this can be achieved through the prioritisation of critical devices. In this introductory paper a generic prioritisation technique for individual devices in a network is described offering a methodical alternative to the current ambiguity of a systems administrator's operations. The technique is based upon compromise path analysis, which identifies critical paths in a network from a security viewpoint and is relevant in a wide range of operations from the application of security services to analysing their results. The vulnerability period metric is introduced, as a mechanism to control the risk exposure to individual devices through prioritisation. - Author(s): C. Cid ; H. Gilbert ; T. Johansson
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 2, p. 51 –53
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20060017
- Type: Article
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Pomaranch is a synchronous stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project. The cipher is constructed as a cascade clock control sequence generator, which is based on the notion of jump registers. We present an attack which exploits the cipher's initialisation procedure to recover the 128-bit secret key. The attack requires around 265 computations. An improved version of the attack is also presented, with complexity of the order of 252 operations. - Author(s): T. Alassiry ; S.-L. Ng ; P. Wild
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 2, p. 54 –57
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055096
- Type: Article
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The paper describes a new attack on the improved robust generalised MQV key agreement protocol without using one-way hash functions proposed by Zuhua Shao. - Author(s): K.G. Paterson
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 2, p. 59 –60
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20060074
- Type: Article
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Lee et al. recently presented a collection of n + 1 different n-party key agreement protocols based on multi-linear forms. Here we show that n − 2 of the protocols are completely insecure, being vulnerable to impersonation attacks. - Author(s): P. Vinod and P.K. Bora
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 2, p. 61 –73
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055088
- Type: Article
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One of the challenging issues in video watermarking is its robustness to inter-frame collusion attacks. These attacks exploit the inherent redundancy in the video frames or in the watermark to produce an unwatermarked copy of the video. A basic inter-frame collusion attack is the frame temporal filtering (FTF). In this attack, temporal low-pass filtering is applied to the watermarked frames to remove temporally uncorrelated watermarks. If the video frames contain moving objects and/or there is camera motion, temporal low-pass filtering introduces visually annoying ghosting artifacts in the attacked video. Thus the applicability of the FTF attack is limited by the motion of the objects in the scene and that of the camera. We propose an extended FTF attack which overcomes this limitation by exploiting the motion within the video frames. The attack is based on the motion-compensated redundant temporal wavelet transform (MC-RTWT) of the watermarked frames. The lifting-based MC-RTWT is applied to the video frames in a scene and the resulting low-pass temporal frames constitute the attacked video. Experimental results presented in this paper confirm the effectiveness of the proposed attack over the FTF attack. A motion-coherent video watermarking scheme in the motion-compensated temporal wavelet transform (MC-TWT) domain is also presented as a countermeasure to this extended FTF attack. The proposed watermarking scheme is shown to be resistant to the extended FTF attack and other inter-frame collusion attacks.
Prioritisation of network security services
Cryptanalysis of Pomaranch
Attack on Shao's key agreement protocol
Attack on some multi-party key agreement protocols
Motion-compensated inter-frame collusion attack on video watermarking and a countermeasure
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