IEE Proceedings - Information Security
Volume 153, Issue 1, March 2006
Volume 153, Issue 1
March 2006
Editorial
- Author(s): Ingemar Cox and Yvo Desmedt
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, page: 1 –1
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20069008
- Type: Article
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- Author(s): H. Li and S. Moore
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, p. 3 –11
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055021
- Type: Article
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The security of cryptographic processors is endangered by optical fault injection attacks. Transistors hit by a pulse of photons causes them to conduct transiently, thereby introducing transient logic errors, such as register value modifications, memory dumping and so on. Attackers can make use of this abnormal behaviour and extract secure information that the devices try to protect. This paper presents a simulation methodology to evaluate the security of cryptographic processors against optical fault injection attacks at design time. This simulation methodology involves exhaustively scanning the layout, incorporating the exposed cells into a circuit simulator and examining the response of the circuit in detail. Simulation performed on a test chip demonstrates that optical fault injection could harm the security of the cryptographic processors in various ways. Experiments conducted on the same test chip spot the same vulnerabilities, thus indicating the validity of the proposed simulation methodology. - Author(s): S.R. Blackburn ; C.F.A. Cid ; S.D. Galbraith
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, p. 12 –14
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055035
- Type: Article
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A public key cryptosystem based on Drinfeld modules has been proposed by Gillard, Leprevost, Panchishkin and Roblot. This article shows how an adversary can directly recover a private key using only the public key; thus the cryptosystem is insecure. - Author(s): J. Zhang ; W. Kou ; K. Fan
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, p. 15 –18
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055069
- Type: Article
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In the existing watermarking protocols, a trusted third party (TTP) is introduced to guarantee that a protocol is fair to both the seller and buyer in a digital content transaction. However, the TTP decreases the security and affects the protocol implementation. To address this issue, in this article a secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol without the assistance of a TTP is proposed in which there are only two participants, a seller and a buyer. Based on the idea of sharing a secret, a watermark embedded in digital content to trace piracy is composed of two pieces of secret information, one produced by the seller and one by the buyer. Since neither knows the exact watermark, the buyer cannot remove the watermark from watermarked digital content, and at the same time the seller cannot fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer. In other words, the proposed protocol can trace piracy and protect the customer's rights. In addition, because no third party is introduced into the proposed protocol, the problem of a seller (or a buyer) colluding with a third party to cheat the buyer (or the seller), namely, the conspiracy problem, can be avoided. - Author(s): L. Chen ; Z. Cheng ; J. Malone-Lee ; M.P. Smart
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, p. 19 –26
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055070
- Type: Article
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The authors describe an identity based key encapsulation mechanism (ID-KEM). It is possible to use this ID-KEM to build a secure identity based encryption scheme using the techniques of Bentahar et al. The resulting encryption scheme has a number of performance advantages over existing methods. - Author(s): M. Abdalla ; P.-A. Fouque ; D. Pointcheval
- Source: IEE Proceedings - Information Security, Volume 153, Issue 1, p. 27 –39
- DOI: 10.1049/ip-ifs:20055073
- Type: Article
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Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) consists of protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key used for authentication is a human-memorable password. In the article, the authors consider PAKE protocols in the 3-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a common secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards their goal, the authors recall some of the existing security notions for PAKE protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions of 3-party protocols. The authors then present a natural generic construction of a 3-party PAKE protocol from any 2-party PAKE protocol and prove its security. To the best of the authors knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably secure PAKE protocol in the 3-party setting.
Security evaluation at design time against optical fault injection attacks
Cryptanalysis of a cryptosystem based on Drinfeld modules
Secure buyer–seller watermarking protocol
Efficient ID-KEM based on the Sakai–Kasahara key construction
Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting
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