Your browser does not support JavaScript!
http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com
1887
banner image
image of Volume 2, Issue 1
Online ISSN 1751-8717 Print ISSN 1751-8709

IET Information Security

Volume 2, Issue 1, March 2008

Volumes & issues:

Volume 2, Issue 1

March 2008

Show / Hide details

    • Security analysis of higher-order Boolean masking schemes for block ciphers (with conditions of perfect masking)
      • Author(s): G. Piret  and  F.-X. Standaert
      • Source: IET Information Security, Volume 2, Issue 1, p. 1 –11
      • DOI:  10.1049/iet-ifs:20070066
      • Type: Article
      • + Show details - Hide details
      • p. 1 –11 (11)
        Side-channel attacks are an important class of cryptanalytic techniques against cryptographic implementations and masking is a frequently considered solution to improve the resistance of a cryptographic implementation against side-channel attacks. The security of higher-order Boolean masking schemes in various contexts is analysed. The results presented are 2-fold. First, the definitions of higher-order side-channel attacks with the related security notions are formalised and certain security weaknesses in recently proposed masking schemes are put forward. Second, the conditions upon which a substitution box in a block cipher can be perfectly masked by Boolean values in order to counteract side-channel attacks are investigated. That is, can the leakages' statistical distributions at a masked S-box output (over all possible masks) be independent of the secret key targeted in the attacks? The consequences of this requirement are studied in two commonly considered leakage models, namely the Hamming weight and distance models, and conditions on the substitution boxes are derived. As a result of the analysis, it appears that these conditions are not achievable as they lead to evident cryptanalytic weaknesses. Thus, it is formally confirmed that masking cannot be used as a stand-alone countermeasure and cannot offer provable security against side-channel attacks.
        Add to favourites
        Export citations
      Diffie–Hellman technique: extended to multiple two-party keys and one multi-party key
      • Author(s): G.P. Biswas
      • Source: IET Information Security, Volume 2, Issue 1, p. 12 –18
      • DOI:  10.1049/iet-ifs:20060142
      • Type: Article
      • + Show details - Hide details
      • p. 12 –18 (7)
        The two-party Diffie–Hellman (DH) key-exchanging technique is extended to generate (i) multiple two-party keys and (ii) one multi-party key. The participants in the former case exchange two public keys and generate 15 shared keys. Of these, 4 keys are called base keys, because they are used to generate the other 11 keys called extended keys. The main advantages are the reduction of the key exchange overhead, increase of additional protection to the keys and widening of applicability. In the latter case, an efficient contributory multi-party key-exchanging technique for a large static group is proposed. In this technique, a member who acts as a group controller forms two-party groups with other group members and generates a DH-style shared key per group. It then combines these keys into a single multi-party key and acts as a normal group member. The proposed technique has been compared with other multi-party key-generating techniques, and satisfactory results have been obtained.
        Add to favourites
        Export citations

Most viewed content for this Journal

Article
content/journals/iet-ifs
Journal
5
Loading

Most cited content for this Journal

Print this page
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address