RT Journal Article
A1 Thomas P. Diakos
A1 Johann A. Briffa
A1 Tim W. C. Brown
A1 Stephan Wesemeyer

PB iet
T1 Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis
JN The Journal of Engineering
VO 2013
IS 10
SP 48
OP 54
AB This paper presents an assessment of how successful an eavesdropping attack on a contactless payment transaction can be in terms of bit and frame error rates, using an easily concealable antenna and low-cost electronics. Potential success of an eavesdropping attack largely depends on the correct recovery of the data frames used in the ISO 14443 standard. A near-field communication inductive loop antenna was used to emulate an ISO 14443 transmission. For eavesdropping, an identical inductive loop antenna as well as a shopping trolley modified to act like an antenna were used. The authors present and analyse frame error rates obtained with the authors equipment over a range of distances, up to 100 cm, well above the official maximum operating distance depending on the magnetic field strength.
K1 eavesdropping attack
K1 ISO 14443 transmission
K1 near-field contactless payment eavesdropping
K1 low-cost electronics
K1 shopping trolley
K1 inductive loop antenna
K1 official maximum operating distance
K1 quantitative analysis
K1 concealable antenna
K1 bit error rates
K1 near-field communication inductive loop antenna
K1 data frame recovery
K1 frame error rates
K1 ISO 14443 standard
K1 contactless payment transaction
K1 magnetic field strength
DO https://doi.org/10.1049/joe.2013.0087
UL https://digital-library.theiet.org/;jsessionid=3on649n4qs25q.x-iet-live-01content/journals/10.1049/joe.2013.0087
LA English
SN
YR 2013
OL EN