http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com
1887

Guess-and-determine attacks on PANAMA-like stream ciphers

Guess-and-determine attacks on PANAMA-like stream ciphers

For access to this article, please select a purchase option:

Buy article PDF
£12.50
(plus tax if applicable)
Buy Knowledge Pack
10 articles for £75.00
(plus taxes if applicable)

IET members benefit from discounts to all IET publications and free access to E&T Magazine. If you are an IET member, log in to your account and the discounts will automatically be applied.

Learn more about IET membership 

Recommend Title Publication to library

You must fill out fields marked with: *

Librarian details
Name:*
Email:*
Your details
Name:*
Email:*
Department:*
Why are you recommending this title?
Select reason:
 
 
 
 
 
IET Information Security — Recommend this title to your library

Thank you

Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

Guess-and-determine attack is a cryptanalysis method that has been applied to various stream ciphers. In this study, the authors study the guess-and-determine attacks on two ISO standardised, Panama-like stream ciphers: MUGI and Enocoro. Utilising the word-oriented structure of the two ciphers, they are able to launch heuristic guess-and-determine attacks in a more efficient manner. Their first target MUGI is both an ISO standard and a Japanese-government-selected CRYPTREC standard. By splitting its basic 64-bit words into 16-bit quarter-words, they are able to conduct a guess-and-determine attack with complexity 2388, much lower than its 1216-bit internal state size. Enocoro is a lightweight stream cipher family. It has two versions named according to key-length as Enocoro-80 and Enocoro-128v2. They provide the specific guessing paths and they are able to launch guess-and-determine attacks on Enocoro-80 and Enocoro-128v2 with complexities 288 and 2144, respectively. In addition to specific attacking results, they also find some generic rules that may help to improve the efficiency of guess-and-determine attacks in the future.

References

    1. 1)
      • 1. Golić, J.: ‘Cryptanalysis of alleged A5 stream cipher’. EUROCRYPT, 1997, Konstanz, Germany, 1997 (LNCS, 1233), pp. 239255.
    2. 2)
      • 2. Hawkes, P., Rose, G.G.: ‘Guess-and-determine attacks on SNOW’. Annual Int. Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2002, St. John's, Canada, 2002 (LNCS, 2595), pp. 3746.
    3. 3)
      • 3. Babbage, S., De Canniere, C., Lano, J.: ‘Cryptanalysis of SOBER-t32’. Int. Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (FSE 2003), Lund, Sweden, 2003 (LNCS, 2887), pp. 111128.
    4. 4)
      • 4. Mattsson, J.: ‘A guess-and-determine attack on the stream cipher polar bear’. SASC 2006, eSTREAM, ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project, Report 2006/017, 2006, pp. 149153.
    5. 5)
      • 5. Feng, X.T., Liu, J., Zhou, Z.C., et al: ‘A byte-based guess and determine attack on SOSEMANUK’. ASIACRYPT 2010, Singapore, 2010 (LNCS, 6477), pp. 146157.
    6. 6)
      • 6. Ahmadi, H., Eghlidos, T.: ‘Heuristic guess-and-determine attacks on stream ciphers’, IET Inf. Sec., 2009, 3, (2), pp. 6673.
    7. 7)
      • 7. Daemen, J., Clapp, C.: ‘Fast hashing and stream encryption with PANAMA’. Fast Software Encryption, Paris, France, 1998 (LNCS, 1372), pp. 6074.
    8. 8)
      • 8. Dai, W., Furuya, S., Yoshida, H., et al: ‘A new keystream generator MUGI’. Fast Software Encryption, Leuven, Belgium, 2002, pp. 3745.
    9. 9)
      • 9. Watanabe, D., Furuya, S., Yoshida, H., et al: ‘MUGI pseudorandom number generator, self-evaluation report, Ver. 1.1, 2001’, 2001, available at http://www.sdl.hitachi.co.jp/crypto/mugi/index-e.html.
    10. 10)
      • 10. Golić, J.D.: ‘A weakness of the linear part of stream cipher MUGI’. Fast Software Encryption, Delhi, India, 2004 (LNCS, 3017), pp. 178192.
    11. 11)
      • 11. Biryukov, A., Shamir, A.: ‘Analysis of the non-linear part of MUGI’, Fast Software Encryption 2005, Paris, France, 2005 (LNCS, 3557), pp. 320329.
    12. 12)
      • 12. Ideguchi, K., Watanabe, D.: ‘Method of security evaluation of guess and determine attacks’. The 2008 Symp. on Cryptography and Information Security, 2008, pp. 3A13A14(in Japanese).
    13. 13)
      • 13. Dai, W., Ideguchi, K., Kitahara, J., et al: ‘Enocoro-80: a hardware oriented stream cipher’. Third Int. Conf. on Availability, Reliability and Security, Hamburg, Germany, 2008, pp. 12941300.
    14. 14)
      • 14. Watanabe, D., Owada, T., Okamoto, K., et al: ‘Update on Enocoro stream cipher’. Int. Symp. on Information Theory and ITS Applications, Taiwan, 2010, pp. 778783.
    15. 15)
      • 15. Muto, K., Watanabe, D., Kaneko, T.: ‘A study on strength of pseudorandom number generator Enocoro-80 against linear distinguish attack’. 30th Symp. on Information Theory and its Applications, Shima, Mie, Japan, 2007(in Japanese).
    16. 16)
      • 16. Furuichi, H., Muto, K., Watanabe, D., et al: ‘Security evaluation of Enocoro-80 against differential resynchronization attack’. The Symp. on Cryptography and Information Security, Miyajaki, Japan, 2008, pp. 4A14A13(in Japanese).
    17. 17)
      • 17. Muto, K., Watanabe, D., Kaneko, T.: ‘Security evaluation of Enocoro-80 against linear resynchronization attack’. The Symp. on Cryptography and Information Security, Miyajaki, Japan, 2008, pp. 4A14A12(in Japanese).
    18. 18)
      • 18. Okamoto, K., Muto, K., Kaneko, T.: ‘Security evaluation of pseudorandom number generator Enocoro-80 against differential/linear cryptanalysis (II)’. The Symp. on Cryptography and Information Security, Otsu, Japan, 2009, pp. 4B24B23(in Japanese).
    19. 19)
      • 19. Hell, M., Johansson, T.: ‘Security evaluation of stream cipher Enocoro-128v2’. Cryptrec Technical Report, 2010.
    20. 20)
      • 20. Kitahara, J., Watanabe, D.: ‘An electrical power evaluation of stream cipher enocoro which is implemented in hardware’. The 2008 Symp. on Cryptography and Information Security, 2008(in Japanese).
    21. 21)
      • 21. Konosu, K., Muto, K., Furuichi, H., et al: ‘Evaluation of enocoro-128 ver.1.1 against resynchronization attack’. IEICE Technical Report ISEC2007-147, 2008(in Japanese).
    22. 22)
      • 22. Muto, K., Watanabe, D., Kaneko, T.: ‘Strength evaluation of Enocoro-128 against LDA and its improvement’. 2008 Symp. on Cryptography and Informa- tion Security, Japan, 2008, pp. 4A14A11(in Japanese).
    23. 23)
      • 23. Watanabe, D., Kaneko, T.: ‘A construction of light weight Panama-like keystream generator’. IEICE Technical Report. vol. 107, No. 209, ISEC2007-78, 2007, pp. 3340(in Japanese).
http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0553
Loading

Related content

content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0553
pub_keyword,iet_inspecKeyword,pub_concept
6
6
Loading
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address