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access icon free Weak keys of the full MISTY1 block cipher for related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis

  • Author(s): Jiqiang Lu 1 ; Wun-She Yap 2, 3 ; Yongzhuang Wei 4, 5
    • View affiliations
  • Source: Volume 12, Issue 5, September 2018, p. 389 – 397
    DOI:  10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0173 , Print ISSN 1751-8709, Online ISSN 1751-8717
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 21/04/2017, Accepted 02/01/2018, Revised 16/11/2017, Published 04/01/2018

The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block size, a 128-bit master key, and a total of 8 rounds. It is an ISO international standard, a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, and a European NESSIE selected cipher. In this study, the authors show another cryptographic weakness of the full MISTY1 cipher: they describe four classes of weak keys of the full MISTY1 cipher for a related-key amplified boomerang attack that has a data complexity of chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of encryptions under each class of weak keys. The result shows that the MISTY1 cipher can be distinguishable from an ideal cipher in terms of related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis, and users should be very careful when using MISTY1 for a full security in relevant application situations.

Inspec keywords: public key cryptography; ISO standards; private key cryptography

Other keywords: Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher; 260.5 chosen plaintexts; 290 weak keys; time complexity; cryptographic weakness; related-key amplified boomerang cryptanalysis; full MISTY1 block cipher; master key; 287.33 encryptions; ISO international standard; block size; European NESSIE selected cipher; data complexity

Subjects: Data security; Cryptography

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