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1887

access icon free Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 17/03/2017, Accepted 04/09/2017, Revised 15/08/2017, Published 05/09/2017

When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets: long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analysed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. The authors provide a generic group key exchange construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Their design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property.

Inspec keywords: cryptographic protocols

Other keywords: freshly generated values; 2-party key exchange protocol; long-term keys; generic group key exchange construction; ephemeral keys; group key exchange protocols

Subjects: Protocols; Cryptography; Data security

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