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Cryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong security

Cryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong security

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In Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced an interesting one-round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes.

http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055
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