Cryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong security
- Author(s): Zheng Yang 1, 2 ; Junyu Lai 3 ; Guoyuan Li 4
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View affiliations
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Affiliations:
1:
Department of Computer Science , University of Helsinki , 00014 , Finland ;
2: School of Computer Science and Engineering , Chongqing University of Technology , Chongqing 400054 , People's Republic of China ;
3: School of Aeronautics and Astronautics , University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 611731 , People's Republic of China ;
4: Department of Ocean Operations and Civil Engineering , Norwegian University of Science and Technology , Aalesund , Norway
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Affiliations:
1:
Department of Computer Science , University of Helsinki , 00014 , Finland ;
- Source:
Volume 12, Issue 1,
January
2018,
p.
71 – 78
DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055 , Print ISSN 1751-8709, Online ISSN 1751-8717
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received
01/02/2017,
Accepted
01/09/2017,
Revised
27/06/2017,
Published
04/09/2017
In Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced an interesting one-round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes.
Inspec keywords: cryptographic protocols
Other keywords: perfect forward secrecy; BJS scheme; cryptanalysis; security proof; one-round key exchange protocol; PFS attack
Subjects: Data security; Protocols; Cryptography
References
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