%0 Electronic Article %A Zheng Yang %A Junyu Lai %A Guoyuan Li %K perfect forward secrecy %K BJS scheme %K cryptanalysis %K security proof %K one-round key exchange protocol %K PFS attack %X In Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced an interesting one-round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes. %@ 1751-8709 %T Cryptanalysis of a generic one-round key exchange protocol with strong security %B IET Information Security %D January 2018 %V 12 %N 1 %P 71-78 %I Institution of Engineering and Technology %U https://digital-library.theiet.org/;jsessionid=3nfd7dgcr47i.x-iet-live-01content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055 %G EN