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access icon free Memory attestation of wireless sensor nodes through trusted remote agents

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 01/12/2016, Accepted 01/06/2017, Revised 02/05/2017, Published 05/06/2017

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been deployed in various commercial, scientific, and military applications for surveillance and critical data collection. A serious threat to sensor nodes is malicious code injection attack that results in fake data delivery or private data disclosure. Memory attestation used for verifying the integrity of a device's firmware is a promising solution for detecting an infected sensor node; particularly, low-cost software-based schemes are suitable for protecting resource-constrained sensor nodes. However, a software-based attestation usually requires some additional mechanisms for providing reliable integrity evidence when the sensor nodes communicate with the verifier through a multihop setting. Alternative hardware-based attestation (e.g. trusted platform module) ensures a reliable integrity measurement that, however, is impractical for certain WSN applications primarily because of the high computational overhead and high hardware cost. The authors propose a lightweight hardware-based memory attestation scheme against the malicious code injection attack, and the proposed scheme employs a lightweight tamper-resistant hardware security module, which is free from any complicated cryptographic computation and is particularly suitable for low-cost sensor nodes. In addition, experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed scheme are presented.

Inspec keywords: telecommunication network reliability; firmware; telecommunication security; wireless sensor networks

Other keywords: lightweight hardware-based memory attestation scheme; reliable integrity evidence; private data disclosure; device firmware integrity; hardware cost; data delivery; data collection; resource-constrained sensor node protection; software-based attestation; trusted remote agents; computational overhead; complicated cryptographic computation; WSNs; low-cost software-based schemes; infected sensor node detection; reliable integrity measurement; malicious code injection attack; wireless sensor networks; wireless sensor nodes; lightweight tamper-resistant hardware security module

Subjects: Wireless sensor networks; Reliability

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