http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com
1887

Impossible differential attacks on the SKINNY family of block ciphers

Impossible differential attacks on the SKINNY family of block ciphers

For access to this article, please select a purchase option:

Buy eFirst article PDF
£12.50
(plus tax if applicable)
Buy Knowledge Pack
10 articles for £75.00
(plus taxes if applicable)

IET members benefit from discounts to all IET publications and free access to E&T Magazine. If you are an IET member, log in to your account and the discounts will automatically be applied.

Learn more about IET membership 

Recommend to library

You must fill out fields marked with: *

Librarian details
Name:*
Email:*
Your details
Name:*
Email:*
Department:*
Why are you recommending this title?
Select reason:
 
 
 
 
 
— Recommend this title to your library

Thank you

Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

SKINNY is a family of lightweight block ciphers proposed at CRYPTO 2016, which follows the TWEAKEY framework and takes a tweakey input. It is shown that SKINNY family not only has good hardware/software performances, but also provides strong security guarantees against differential/linear cryptanalysis. In this study, the authors study the security of SKINNY against the impossible differential attack. First, they get some properties of the subkeys of SKINNY by analysing its key schedule. Then, combining with the early-abort technique and the greedy strategy, they present impossible differential attacks on SKINNY based on an 11-round impossible differential. Let SKINNY-n-k be the SKINNY cipher with n-bit block size and k-bit tweakey size. On the basis of their method, 17-round SKINNY-64-64 (resp. SKINNY-128-128) can be broken in (resp. ) 17-round encryptions, 19-round SKINNY-64-128 (resp. SKINNY-128-256) can be broken in (resp. ) 19-round encryptions and 21-round SKINNY-64-192 (resp. SKINNY-128-384) can be broken in (resp. ) 21-round encryptions. To the best of their knowledge, these results are currently the best results with respect to the attacked rounds.

http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0488
Loading

Related content

content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0488
pub_keyword,iet_inspecKeyword,pub_concept
6
6
Loading
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address