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access icon free Conditional differential attacks on Grain-128a stream cipher

  • Author(s): Zhen Ma 1, 2 ; Tian Tian 2 ; Wen-Feng Qi 2
    • View affiliations
    • Affiliations: 1: State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, People's Republic of China ;
      2: National Digital Switching System Engineering and Technological Research Center, P.O. Box 407, 62 Kexue Road, Zhengzhou, 450001, People's Republic of China
  • Source: Volume 11, Issue 3, May 2017, p. 139 – 145
    DOI:  10.1049/iet-ifs.2016.0060 , Print ISSN 1751-8709, Online ISSN 1751-8717
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 27/01/2016, Accepted 21/06/2016, Revised 03/06/2016, Published 24/06/2016

The well-known stream cipher Grain-128a is the new version of Grain-128. While Grain-128 is vulnerable against several introduced attacks, Grain-128a is claimed to be secure against all known attacks and observations on Grain-128. So far the only published single-key attack on Grain-128a is the conditional differential cryptanalysis proposed by Michael Lehmann et al. at CANS 2012. In their analysis, a distinguishing attack on 189-round Grain-128a in a weak-key setting was proposed. In this study, the authors present two new conditional differential attacks on Grain-128a, i.e. attack A and attack B. In attack A, the authors successfully retrieve 18 secret key expressions for 169-round Grain-128a. To the best of our knowledge, attack A is the first attack to retrieve secret key expressions for reduced Grain-128a. In attack B, the authors extend the distinguishing attack against Grain-128a up to 195 rounds in a weak-key setting. Thus far, attack B is the best known attack for reduced Grain-128a as far as the number of rounds attacked is concerned. Hopefully, the authors’ reflections on the design of Grain-128a provide insights on such compact stream ciphers.

Inspec keywords: cryptography

Other keywords: Grain-128a stream cipher; conditional differential attacks; single-key attack; conditional differential cryptanalysis; secret key expression retrieval

Subjects: Cryptography; Data security

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