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access icon free Leakage-resilient message authentication code scheme based on hidden identity weak hash proof system

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 02/04/2014, Accepted 02/09/2015, Revised 05/04/2015, Published 01/07/2016

Hazay et al. initiated the formal study of leakage-resilient message authentication code (MAC) and presented a MAC scheme that is both leakage resilient and unforgeable against chosen message and no verification query attack (uf-cm-nvq). As the communication overhead of their construction is linear with the parameters that control the leakage bound, their scheme sacrifices efficiency in exchange for leakage resilience. In this study, the authors study the problem of designing leakage-resilient MACs in the public-key setting with acceptable communication efficiency. In particular, a notion called ‘hidden identity weak hash proof system’(HID-wHPS) is introduced. Then a generic MAC construction is presented under the abstraction framework of HID-wHPS. Security properties guaranteed by HID-wHPS enable us to prove the author's construction to be both leakage resilient and uf-cm-nvq in a modular way. Finally, performance analysis shows that their MAC construction yields improved tagging-key size, tag size as well as computation overhead under the given leakage bound.

Inspec keywords: public key cryptography

Other keywords: MAC construction; hidden identity weak hash proof system; public key setting; leakage resilient MAC; security properties; leakage bound; leakage resilient message authentication code scheme; HID-wHPS; verification query attack

Subjects: Data security; Cryptography

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