access icon free Improved impossible differential attack on reduced version of Camellia with FL/FL −1 functions

© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Received 16/11/2013, Accepted 02/12/2015, Revised 08/11/2015, Published 28/06/2016

As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used in various cryptographic applications. In this study, the authors present the best currently known attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers FL/FL −1 (without the whitening layers) by taking advantage of the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions, the redundancy of key schedule and the early abort technique. Specifically, the authors mount the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia-192 with 2124.79 chosen plaintexts, 2186.09 13-round encryptions and 2129.79 bytes, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, the authors successfully attack on 14-round Camellia-256 with 2122.14 chosen plaintexts, 2228.33 14-round encryptions and 2134.14 bytes. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time and memory complexities are reduced by 29.87 times and 246.06 times, and the data complexity is comparable.

Inspec keywords: IEC standards; ISO standards; cryptography

Other keywords: Camellia standard; cryptographic applications; time complexity; Camellia-256; impossible differential attack; data complexity; Camellia-192; IEC international standard; ISO international standard; memory complexity

Subjects: Cryptography; Data security

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