Differential fault analysis on LED using Super-Sbox

Guangyao Zhao; Ruilin Li; Lei Cheng; Chao Li; Bing Sun

Differential fault analysis on LED using Super-Sbox

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Author(s): Guangyao Zhao ¹ ; Ruilin Li ² ; Lei Cheng ³ ; Chao Li ^{1, 3} ; Bing Sun ³
- Affiliations: 1: Institute of Network Technology and Information Security, College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, Hunan, People's Republic of China;
  2: Department of Communication Engineering, College of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, Hunan, People's Republic of China;
  3: Department of Applied Mathematics and System Science, College of Science, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, Hunan, People's Republic of China
Source: Volume 9, Issue 4, July 2015, p. 209 – 218
DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2013.0549 , Print ISSN 1751-8709, Online ISSN 1751-8717

Received 23/12/2013, Accepted 11/11/2014, Revised 22/10/2014, Published 19/12/2014

Light encryption device (LED) is a 64 bit lightweight block cipher proposed by Guo et al. at CHES 2011, and its key size is primarily defined as 64 and 128 bits. This study studies differential fault analysis (DFA) of LED using the technique of Super-Sbox analysis. Under various fault models, the fault pattern propagation rule of the Super-Sbox can be obtained, based on which the efficiency of fault attack on LED can be greatly improved. For LED-64, under the nibble-based fault model, a random nibble fault at the 30th round can reduce the size of key search space to 2⁷–2²⁰ (average 2^14.02). Even if a random nibble fault is injected into the 29th round, the size of the key search space can also be reduced to about 2^17.43–2^17.72 (average 2^17.65) using early-abort technique. Although under the byte-based fault model, a random byte fault at the 30th round can reduce the size of the key space to 2⁷–2¹⁶ (average 2^11.92). If the adversary has the capability of injecting two random nibble faults at some specified rounds, then the above fault attack on LED-64 can be similarly extended to LED-128, and the size of the exhaustive search space for the 128 bit key can be reduced to 2¹⁵–2^27.94 (average 2^21.96). These results demonstrate that Super-Sbox is a powerful technique that can be used to obtain significant improvements in the key filtration, and thus improve the efficiency of DFA on some special ciphers.

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Differential fault analysis on LED using Super-Sbox

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