Design of robust profitable false data injection attacks in multi-settlement electricity markets
The potential impacts of data integrity attacks on multi-settlement electricity markets have been recently investigated and have sent a strong message to power grids independent system operators (ISOs) that adversaries could launch profitable cyber attacks by casting an incorrect image of transmission lines congestion pattern. However, these cautionary messages may be underestimated due to the adversaries unrealistic requirements (e.g. having access to real-time measurements) to launch a successful stealthy and profitable attack. This study examines the potential of the aforementioned risk by demonstrating how a malicious power market participant could disturb the electricity market operation, using a pre-designed false data injection attack along with bogus electricity trades in both day-ahead and real-time markets. The proposed attack design is robust against market uncertainties and the adversary can guarantee the success of the attack in advance. Hence, the existence of such cyber attacks against electricity markets can make the adversaries more aggressive. The numerical results on the IEEE 14-bus test system confirm the vulnerability of multi-settlement electricity markets to such financial cyber attacks. The results obtained from investigating such an attack design can be employed by ISOs in order to provide appropriate countermeasures.