Game-theoretic resource allocation scheme for multiple-amplify-and-forward-relay wireless networks
Mitigating the effect of fading in wireless networks has been a prominent benefit associated with cooperative relaying. Especially in multi-relay scenarios, efficient resource allocation can drastically improve the performance of cooperative systems affected by fading. However, practically, a relay may not cooperate unless provided with some incentive to improve its utility. To address the above problem, this study introduces a novel integrated game-theoretic framework which involves incentive-based optimal power allocation. Coalition formation game has been used to model the cooperation among relays which is integrated into a Stackelberg game, for considering the benefits of source and relays jointly. The game-theoretic framework has been implemented for both disjoint and overlapping coalitions with an objective to find an optimal and stable overlapping coalition set of relays. This not only maximises their utilities, but also helps the source to allocate the optimal power to the relays at the optimal price, thereby, increasing its own utility. Simulation results have confirmed that the proposed game-theoretic solutions achieve comparable performance in terms of system throughput when compared with the centralised approach. In particular, overlapping coalition approach exhibits consistently better performance than the disjoint coalitions approach due to increased power allocation to individual relays.