Fair incentive mechanism with pyramidal structure for peer-to-peer networks

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Abstract

Free-riding is a grave threat against the existence and efficient operation of peer-to-peer networks. This study proposes a rank-based fair incentive mechanism to restrain free-riding and solve the problem of the tragedy of the commons. In this mechanism, each user has a rank according to its utility value and it can just visit the corresponding rating files with its rank in the system. The utility function in this study takes the absolute contribution value and the physical performance into account for fairness and their values are calculated by the analytic hierarchy process. Besides, a pyramidal rank structure is constructed in this mechanism, and the computation formula for the node's transfer in each layer is established. In addition, the four defects in other restrain mechanisms are resolved in this incentive mechanism. The simulations in three aspects have verified that this mechanism is effective and practical.

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