Trusted Computing
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This book provides an introduction to trusted computing technology and its applications. As computers are increasingly embedded and wireless connected, security becomes imperative.
Inspec keywords: peer-to-peer computing; security of data
Other keywords: single sign-on; certificate management; mobile receivers; NGSCB; trusted computing technology; TCG; user privacy; conditional access application; distributed trusted third parties; peer-to-peer network
Subjects: Data security; Distributed systems software
- Book DOI: 10.1049/PBPC006E
- Chapter DOI: 10.1049/PBPC006E
- ISBN : 9780863415258
- e-ISBN: 9781849190473
- Page count: 328
- Format: PDF
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Front Matter
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1 What is trusted computing?
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What does trust mean? For the purposes of this book, perhaps the simplest definition would be that trusted computing refers to a computer system for which an entity has some level of assurance that (part or all of) the computer system is behaving as expected. The entity may be any one of various things, including the human user of the PC or a program running on a remote machine. The degree of coverage of this assurance, that is, whether it covers all aspects of the system or just some part, and the nature of the entity to which assurance is provided, vary depending on the system and the environment within which it is used.
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2 Concepts of trusted computing
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This chapter discusses the ubiquitous trusted computing. Trusted platforms can also enable agent technology. Ubiquitous trusted computing, however, software agents can carry private data and secret keys (symmetric keys and/or private asymmetric keys) with them, and use them to create data authorised by the agent, on behalf of the agent's owner. Ultimately, trusted platforms may enable a global ubiquitous computing and communication infrastructure, where users neither know nor care where their data is stored or processed, because they know that use of their information is controlled by enforceable policies.
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3 An overview of trusted computing technology
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In this chapter, the state of the art in trusted computing technology has been examined. Various initiatives, projects and specification sets have been explored. It is clear that, despite the negative criticism often associated with this particular area of computing, trusted computing technologies offer a wide range of functionality which may be leveraged to improve computer security. It must also be noted, however, that this chapter reflects these technologies as they are currently documented. This area is the subject of much current research and development, and the specifications, functionality, architectures, mechanisms and implementations associated with trusted computing technologies are evolving and changing very rapidly.
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4 An overview of NGSCB
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A major challenge the computer industry is facing today is how to effectively protect end users against a plethora of email viruses and network intrusions. An obvious solution is to make the desktop operating system (OS) and applications flawless and bug-free. However, experience shows that this is an impractical goal. The reasons are threefold: the rich functionality users expect from mass market OSs makes these systems so large and complex that security bugs will exist even after rigorous testing and the use of advanced quality assurance methodology during the development process; similar problems apply to applications and device drivers; finally, configuration and maintenance are non-trivial, such that users often misconfigure the system. Security vulnerabilities exist largely due to software bugs, some of which are in the operating systems. Commercial OSs have rapidly grown in size in order to provide ever richer user experiences. Rigorous development and testing can uncover and eliminate a large percentage of these bugs. However, a small number will always remain. The problem is further compounded by the necessity to support an arbitrary number of devices in a consumer desktop OS. A bug in a device driver may be exploited to subvert the system. Again, although stringent testing standards are successful at reducing the number of driver bugs, security vulnerabilities cannot be completely eliminated in complex device drivers.
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5 The DAA scheme in context
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This chapter describes the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme in the con text of its development and use within the TCG specification. This scheme was originated by Brickell, Camemsch and Chen. It was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group as the method for remote anonymous authen tication of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). In this chapter, we first talk about how the work of designing DAA started from a conflict between the need for security and the need for privacy in TPM authentication. In the historical context, we acknowledge various schemes which have been developed in response to this TCG problem, and which eventually led to the DAA scheme. In the context of a solution to the problem. we focus on explaining how the DAA scheme proposed by Brickell, Camemsch and Chen works. In the context of further consideration, we discuss some options for the reissue of DAA keys and some possible improvements to increase the performance of the DAA.
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6 Single sign-on using TCG-conformant platforms
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This chapter examines an application that can potentially benefit from trusted computing, namely single sign-on (SSO). SSO gives the user the ability to log into systems and applications without the need to maintain separate authentication credentials for each such system and application. In other words, an SSO scheme allows the user to log into (ideally) all relevant systems and applications, using only one set of authentication credentials (e.g. only one username/password pair). In the remainder of the chapter, we use the generic term 'service provider' (SP) to refer to systems and/or applications in the context of SSO.
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7 Secure delivery of conditional access applications to mobile receivers
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One of the driving forces behind recent developments in mobile communications systems is the potential for such systems to deliver more complex content to con sumers. Current 3G systems are capable of delivering multimedia clips to subscribers' mobile telephones. The next generation of communications systems are expected to develop this service, and collaborate with broadcast systems to provide wireless access to video content from a wide range of mobile devices. For a service like this to achieve its full commercial potential, the owners of the content will require assurance that their material is not illegally accessed. Current broadcast systems accomplish this by using conditional access systems to ensure that only bona fide subscribers have access to the content.
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8 Enhancing user privacy using trusted computing
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User location information (LI) has the potential to be the basis of many different services, ranging from route planning to user location in emergency situations. Such services are frequently associated with, but are not limited to, mobile devices. Fixed devices, such as desktop PCs, may also be used to receive such services. As these services become widely available, privacy concerns will also become more significant. Of course, user location is not the only personal attribute which may cause privacy concerns. Medical information and personal bank details are amongst the many other types of personal details a user may not wish to publicise.
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9 Certificate management using distributed trusted third parties
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In this chapter, a novel way of delegating a TTP service from a central TTP to a secure execution environment (SEE) running on a user's machine is proposed. It also shows significant advantages for some types of TTP service and, in particular, it may be a useful technique for solving some of the problems traditionally associated with certificate authorities (CAs).
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10 Securing peer-to-peer networks usingtrusted computing
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It seems likely that TCG-compliant computing platforms will become widespread over the next few years. Once one accepts that the trusted computing paradigm offers an interesting and powerful set of security features, the natural question arises: for what purposes can this technology be exploited? In this chapter, we examine the application of trusted computing to securing peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
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11 The future of trusted computing: an outlook
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One can expect a number of new applications that support the management of large networks, for example, to automatically verify that all machines have a proper patch level or only contain company authorised software, to maintain control over signature and encryption keys, etc. As trusted computing (TC) technology exists on the lowest hardware level of the computer, it has to be further supported by higher-level functionality such as the operating system before mainstream applications can fully profit from the concept. Thus, outside of such applications and those that use cryptography anyway, little use will be made of TC in the near future. The candidate application that always most commonly appears in the press and various Internet discussions is the use of TC for digital rights management (DRM), i.e. the option to attach a policy to a piece of data and remotely enforce this policy. While research in this area is becoming rather active, the author is not aware of any attempts to use Trusted Computing Group (TCG) technology to this end on a personal computer (PC) platform. It is debatable if the TC concepts can significantly assist a DRM system on a PC platform without massive changes to the underlying operating system. Without some significant innovation, a DRM system using the Trusted Platform Module will probably not be much more secure than one without.
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Back Matter
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